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Impact of performance audit on the Administration:  
A Belgian study (2005-2010) 
 
Abstract 
 
Purpose –This study of the impact of Belgian Court of Audit on the federal 
Administration for the 2005 to 2010 period aims to highlight the auditors’ influence on 
the management of governmental organizations through the performance audits they have 
been conducting since 1998. A set of ten variables allows us to measure the three types of 
uses of performance auditors’ work by auditees: instrumental, conceptual and strategic 
uses. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – A survey was sent out to a total of 148 respondents 
identified by the authorities of the targeted organizations. 47 usable questionnaires were 
completed (32% response rate). 
 
Findings – The Court of Audit’s impact on the audited entities did not provoke radical 
changes in the auditees’ organizational life but the intervention of the auditors was 
nevertheless noticeable. The nature of the impact was rather conceptual than strategic or 
instrumental. And the negative consequences on auditees anticipated in the literature 
were not observed. 
 
Research limitations/implications – Given the five-year period covered by the study 
which was made in 2014 (four years after 2010), it had to deal with the mortality of 
respondents and the loss of organizational memory.  
 
Practical implications – The study gives more accurate insights about the influence that 
Supreme Audit Institutions actually exert on audited Administrations through their 
performance audits.  
 
Originality/value – Since Supreme Audit Institutions have been mandated to evaluate 
government’s economy, efficiency and effectiveness for almost 40 years in the western 
democracies, it is mandatory that their actual ability to influence Administrations be 
documented more abundantly and independently by academic researchers. 
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Impact of performance audit on the Administration:  
A Belgian study (2005-2010) 
 
Introduction 
 
As of 1998, the conduct of performance audits has become an integral part of the Belgian 
Court of Audit’s portfolio, and a valuable addition to the Court’s activities in financial 
audits and regularity audits. By conducting performance audits, the Belgian Court of 
Audit follows common practice of many Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) in the OECD 
area. Irrespective the particular terminology applied within a specific country (for 
instance: ‘contrôle de la bonne gestion’, ‘value for money audits’), performance audits 
concern the assessment of government management in terms of the so-called three E’s: 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness. With new competencies on the agenda, the 
mandate of many SAIs has been reformulated in a more encompassing way, in the 
previous two decades. Traditionally, the role of the SAIs was commonly denoted as 
‘watchdogs’, i.e. assisting parliamentary assemblies in exercising their supervising 
function as regards collecting and spending of public funds (Sterck, 2007; Van Loocke & 
Put, 2010). Nowadays, some Supreme Audit Institutions have endorsed the role of 
‘advisors’, charged with the explicit task to contribute to an improvement of public 
management. The Belgian Court of Audit upholds this double mission (Rekenhof, 2004: 
1). 
 
Having impact is hence the common rationale of these “watchdogs” who want to 
influence the entities audited and expect their recommendations to be implemented. This 
ambition is likely to have an impact on the SAIs’ auditing process:  from selecting audit 
topics, planning the work, to drafting audit reports (Lonsdale, 1999). Impact is also a 
leitmotif in the professional standards developed by the International Organization of 
Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI, 2013), as can be derived from the following 
excerpts: 
The main objective of performance auditing is constructively to promote 
economical, effective and efficient governance (p.13) 
The topic selection process should aim to maximize the expected impact of 
the audit while taking account of audit capacities (p.13) 
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The report should explain why and how problems noted in the findings 
hamper performance in order to encourage the audited entity or report user to 
initiate corrective action (p.16) 
 
The question can yet be raised whether these high ambitions are actually realized in 
practice. In this article we empirically address this puzzle, by a systematic study of the 
impact of the audits conducted by the Belgian Court of Audit within the federal 
administration in the period 2005-2010. We present the results of a survey that has been 
previously conducted in a Canadian context (Morin, 2008, 2014). Based on the survey 
findings, we will answer the following two questions, both approached from the auditees’ 
standpoint: 
1. What has been the impact of the performance audits on the management of 
audited entities in the Belgian federal administration?  
2. Which factors have contributed to this impact if any?  
 
With this survey, we aim to meet three objectives of theoretical, empirical and normative 
value: First, we assess the assumption raised by several scholars (Power, 1997; Leeuw, 
2006; Lonsdale, 1999) that the potential impact of SAIs is often overestimated. SAIs 
often implicitly apply a mechanistic feedback theory, which does not always match the 
complex audit reality. In the Canadian setting (Morin, 2008, 2014), this assumption could 
not be discredited. Overall, the impact of the Auditor General (which is the appellation 
for the Canadian Supreme Audit Institution (SAI)) proved to be generally limited. The 
question is, though, whether this pessimistic assumption also applies to the Belgian 
Court, which is in contrast to the Canadian Westminster-style SAI a case of the 
Napoleonic family of SAIs.  
 
Secondly, the study is also practically relevant for the work of the SAIs’ auditors who are 
required to monitor the impact of their recommendations, in compliance with the 
INTOSAI standards. This study complements SAIs’ anecdotal evidence with more 
systematic data, at least for the Belgian federal case. We trust that the method used and 
findings are inspirational for SAIs to set up a more systematic monitoring system of their 
impact on audited Administrations.   
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Third, a study about the impact of performance audits has important normative value. 
Having impact is essential for the legitimacy of Supreme Audit Institutions’ auditors vis-
à-vis auditees and vis-à-vis the tax-payers (Lonsdale, 1999; Van Loocke, 2013). We 
believe that Morin’s (2001) claim (115-116) is still valid: “Time is up for certain political 
institutions which have been considered sacred cows, above attack and unimpeachable in 
their effectiveness. The Auditors General offices should not be above the questions which 
have been aimed at most of the other public institutions”. 
 
The article is structured as follows: First we present the conceptual framework that 
supports our investigation of SAIs’ impact on Administrations through their performance 
audits. After introducing the Belgian Court of Audit’s context, we explain the variables 
tested and the methodology to do so.  We then present the results of the survey followed 
by a discussion and a conclusion about the Court’s impact on Belgian federal 
Administration for the performance audits conducted during the period 2005-2010. 
Investigating impact: our conceptual and theoretical stance 
 
Unraveling impact in different types 
 
Investigating Supreme Audit Institutions’ impact is a challenging undertaking because of 
the conceptual confusion that surrounds the notion. In this article, we subscribe to 
Lonsdale’s conception of SAIs’ impact through performance audits (1999: 171):  
By impact we mean primarily the direct and indirect effect or influence that a 
Supreme Audit Institution (SAI) can have on the practices, performance and 
culture of the audited entity as a result of its performance audit work. Impact may 
arise from recommendations made by the SAI which result in the strengthening of 
weak administrative procedures and practices or lead to financial savings. 
Alternatively, it may involve influencing, or, in some cases, instigating debate on 
a particular subject. And, lest we assume that SAIs can have impact only when 
they bring about change, we should not also forget the reinforcement value of 
positive assurance provided by performance auditors where they find good 
practice.  
 
Lonsdale emphasizes the various forms that SAIs’ impact can take. In accordance with 
the literature about the utilization, influence and impact of policy evaluations (Pollitt, 
 6 
2006; Weets, 2001), three types of SAIs’ impact have been identified: instrumental, 
conceptual and strategic uses (Cummings, 2002; Kirkhart, 2000; Widmer & 
Neuenschwander, 2004).  
 
Instrumental use refers to performance audits influencing policy decisions or contributing 
to solve specific problems. The auditors’ recommendations are then supposed to lead to 
immediate and visible actions taken by auditees. This type of use reflects a linear idea of 
impact which is predominantly present among many courts of audit. The will to improve 
the functioning of governments by means of performance audits is an idea present in the 
mission statement of pretty many Supreme Audit Institutions in western countries (Van 
Loocke and Put, 2010, 2011; Morin and Hazgui, 2016). 
  
Conceptual use is mostly associated with Carol Weiss’ (1977) notion of the 
‘enlightenment’ input of audits or evaluations. Auditors’ reports can then help to better 
understand a specific policy measure, or the causal mechanisms of a potential 
dysfunction. In this perspective, the impact is conceived as cognitive and will not 
necessarily be translated in visible or tangible changes. Strategic use, also coined 
persuasive or symbolic use, implies SAIs’ reports being instrumentalized to feed the 
political debate.  
 
The various types of impact are not mutually exclusive. One single audit can 
simultaneously serve multiple types of use. Conceptual use, though, usually precedes the 
other types (Cummings, 2002). Some authors (Widmer and Neuenschwander, 2004 for 
example) further distinguish between interactive use (procedural use by different 
stakeholders), political-legitimizing use (ex post justifying certain decisions), and tactical 
use (winning time). For our study, we have focused on the three most frequently 
functions which are acknowledged for performance audits.  
 
A comprehensive understanding of impact also requires taking into account the time 
frame for the impact to be manifested. Kirkhart (2000) made a substantial theoretical 
contribution in this regard. ‘Immediate’ impact occurs during the actual planning and 
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implementation of the audit or evaluation. ‘End of cycle’ influence coincides with the 
conclusion of the evaluation process. ‘Long term’ impact refers to the use of auditors’ 
findings and recommendations in a near future, but not necessarily immediately after 
their audit. We follow Kirkhart in stating that the time frame should be conceived 
independently of the earlier mentioned types of use: instrumental use is not necessary 
apparent in the short term, and conceptual use should not be strictly associated with long 
term use. Lonsdale (1999) furthermore states that the existence of performance audits as 
such can have a deterrent effect which notably entails discouraging ‘bad practice’. In 
Kirkhart’s time frame perspective, this type of use would be labeled as ‘preventive’ use.  
 
Factors influencing SAIs’ impact on Administrations through performance audits 
 
In 2016, academic research about SAIs’ impact on Administrations through their 
performance audits is still very scarce. In 2010, Van Loocke and Put, both working at the 
Belgian Court, made an extensive international literature review of empirical studies 
about this SAIs’ impact. They inventoried fourteen empirical studies. Systematic 
comparison of these studies was difficult since they varied substantially in research 
questions, scope, concepts, etc. Since 2010, several new studies have been published 
about SAIs’ impact (Kells and Hodge, 2011; Morin, 2014; Nurul, Athira Abd Manaf, 
2010; Raudla et al., 2015; Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2010; Van Acker et al., 2014). The 
major findings of these studies are generally in line with their predecessors. On the basis 
of their review, Van Loocke and Put (2010, 2011) compiled a comprehensive overview 
of factors that return in the literature as potentially influencing the impact of performance 
audits. The factors are ordered in a theoretical model, composed of three clusters: factors 
situated at micro-level (i.e. related to the audit itself); factors at meso-level (concerning 
the SAIs and the entity audited); and factors at macro level (relating to the public sector). 
It would exceed the scope of this article to extensively introduce each of these factors. 
The figure 1 summarizes all factors that might influence the impact of performance audits 
conducted by SAIs.  
Figure 1 
 
MICRO-LEVEL. Factors specific to the audit 
itself: 
- Relationship auditor – auditee during 
the audit (trust, communication, 
shared repertoires) ) 
- The audit report (relevance, 
timeliness) 
 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Van Loocke and Put (2010, 2011) 
 
As far as the methodology is concerned, no less than one third of the available studies 
identified by Van Loocke and Put (2010, 2011) simply use the percentage of 
implemented recommendations as an impact indicator. This only indicator, while 
straightforward to apply, has important drawbacks (Lonsdale, 1999; Morin, 2001, 2008, 
2014; Van Loocke and Put, 2010, 2011): 
- It only reveals tangible instrumental impact, neglecting the other types of impact; 
- It does not take into account the relative importance (in financial or societal terms) of 
the recommendations and the complexity of implementing them; 
- Some improvements are already implemented during the process of auditing itself. In 
this case, performance auditors will not formulate any recommendations, although 
there has been impact; 
MESO-LEVEL. The SAI’s and the audited 
entities’ characteristics: 
- Willingness from the audited 
organization 
- Ongoing reform in the audited 
entity 
- Ad hoc events 
MACRO-LEVEL. Characteristics of the public 
sector: 
- Media pressure 
- Pressure from interest groups 
- Pressure from Parliament 
IMPACT 
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- Implementing recommendations does not necessarily lead to improvements; and not 
implementing recommendations is not always a bad thing; 
Given these shortcomings, we proceed with an alternative, albeit more encompassing, 
measurement instrument, which was previously tested in the case of performance audits 
in Canada (Morin, 2001, 2008, 2014). Before elaborating on the particularities of our 
survey, we first expand on the characteristics of the Belgian Court.  
Our case: the impact of Court of Audit on Belgian federal Administration 
 
Like many other SAIs in western countries, Belgian Court of Audit promotes the double 
mission of ‘advisor’ and ‘watchdog’. As mentioned in its annual report (2010, i.e. the 
period to which this empirical study refers): “The Court aims at improving the 
functioning of public service through auditing public administrative authorities and 
assessing the implementation of government policy and the results obtained”. The Court 
has the duty to assist the parliamentary assemblies and the provincial councils in their 
supervisory function of collecting and spending public funds. It reports on its findings 
and provides its opinions and recommendations following their government budget 
reviews and their audit activities (legality, regularity, financial and performance audits). 
In addition, the Court of Audit is entrusted with a jurisdictional assignment towards the 
public accounting officers whose accounts are in deficit. The Belgian Court of Audit is, 
given the federal setting of Belgian, entitled to conduct independent audits of the revenue 
and expenditure of the entire state: being the Federal State, the Communities and 
Regions, the subsidiary public bodies thereof and the provinces. Again given the bipolar 
federal nature of the country, the Court consists of two chambers, one French-speaking 
and another Dutch-speaking, which jointly constitute the general assembly. Each 
chamber comprises a president, four councilors and a secretary general. The Belgian 
court members are appointed by the House of Representatives for a renewable term of six 
years. The Belgian Court of Audit is a member of INTOSAI and is hence subjected to its 
professional standards. To be clear, the scope of the audits investigated in the present 
study only concerns the Belgian federal government. The Court of Audit’s Federal State 
audit field is split up in seventeen policy domains:  justice, social security and public 
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health are among the most important (in terms of material weight) domains (Belgian 
Court of Audit, 2010). 
 
Measuring the impact of the Belgian Court of Audit through its performance audits 
 
We have measured the impact of the Court from ten angles, and thus expanded the scant 
knowledge in the literature of the true impact that SAIs exert on management of 
Administrations through performance audits. The ten elements of measurement that 
underpin the model used to evaluate the impact of performance audits on the 
management of the Belgian federal Administration are mainly derived from the works of 
Pollitt et al. (1999) and Morin (2000, 2001, 2008, 2014). The set of variables allows us to 
measure the three types of impact that we earlier referred to. Where applicable, we 
mention in parentheses the type of use. The variables measured are the same presented in 
Morin (2008, 2014): 
(1) contribution of performance audits (Instrumental/Conceptual); 
(2) relevance of auditors’ recommendations; 
(3) preventive effect exerted by performance audits on auditees (cfr. Lonsdale, 1999); 
(4) influence exerted by the performance audit on auditees’ management practices 
(Instrumental); 
(5) influence exerted by the performance audit on the audited organization’s relations 
with stakeholders (Instrumental); 
(6) usefulness of auditors’ reports (Instrumental/Conceptual/Strategic); 
(7) concrete actions taken by auditees following the performance audit (Instrumental); 
(8) organizational consequences of audits; 
(9) personal consequences of audits; and 
(10) perceived overall impact on the management of the organization audited. 
 
The conditions (also taken from Morin: 2008, 2014) that might have influenced the Court 
of Audit’s ability to exert its influence on Administration through its performance audits 
have been tested on respondents who completed the survey questionnaire. Respondents 
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were asked whether the conditions below, if applicable, helped or hindered the 
implementation of auditors’ recommendations: 
- the will of those at the base of the organization, 
- the intervention of parliamentarians, 
- the departure of key people in the organization audited,  
- the place of auditors’ recommendations among auditees’ priorities,  
- the political and central authorities’ will,  
- the timing of the audit,  
- a major reorganization underway in the organization audited or a reform on the 
government level,  
- press coverage.  
 
When linking this to the earlier presented literature review of Van Loocke and Put, we 
can conclude that the survey does cover all factors of potential causal influence, apart 
from ‘pressure of interest groups’ and ‘ad hoc events’.  
Methodology 
 
The research was conducted
1
 among the civil servants of the Belgian federal government 
who were involved in one or more performance audits of the Court of Audit between 
2005 and 2010. The audits were compiled from a list of audit reports produced by the 
Court for its ‘Synthesis of norms from performance audits (1998-2011)’ (2011). All 49 
audit reports published between 2005 and 2010 were considered for the research. The 
audits involved a varying number of government organizations: between one and 15 per 
audit. In total, 44 different government organizations were involved. The number of 
audits per organization during this period (2005-2010) ranged from 1 to 12.  
 
An oriented sample of respondents was studied. In this approach, it is important that the 
respondents have “undergone” a performance audit done by the Court, either during the 
actual audit or during the follow-up of auditors’ recommendations, or both. 
                                                          
1
 The research was conducted by Ms. Ella Desmedt as part of her master studies at KU Leuven University 
(Desmedt, 2014). 
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Consequently, we needed to enlist the assistance of a top authority within the audited 
organization, to identify informed respondents. Via email the organizational heads were 
asked whether they were willing to cooperate, and we asked them to provide a list of 
email addresses of civil servants involved in the performance audit(s) of their 
organization. The email invitation did not mention that one of the researchers was 
employed by the Court. The Belgium Court of Audit was not explicitly asked to take part 
in this research project.  
 
Our questionnaire was the same as that used in two Canadian studies on the impact of 
Auditors general on Administrations through performance audits (Morin: 2008, 2014).  It 
was translated into Flemish and administered electronically on the Limesurvey server of 
KU Leuven University. The first invitation to complete the survey was sent on March 24, 
2014, and data collection was finalized by April 20, 2014. The invitation and 
questionnaire were sent directly to the respondents. The top management of the 
organization was not informed of the participants’ responses, namely whether or not they 
completed the questionnaire, nor of the nature of the responses to the questionnaire.   
 
Below we provide an overview of the reactions of the 44 Belgian federal organizations 
following the initial invitation to take part in the survey: 
 26 organizations agreed to participate (although there were six organizations for 
which we did not receive any completed questionnaire); 
 9 organizations responded they were not willing to cooperate: 
o 3 referred to a shortage of staff members and mentioned other priorities, 
o 1 organization did not mention any reason; 
 9 organizations did not reply to the invitation. 
The survey response rates of the 148 civil servants who were identified by the heads of 
organizations willing to cooperate are as follows: 
 
 
 Number Percentage 
Response: completed survey 47 32% 
Partial non-response: partly completed survey 30 20% 
Non-response: no answer 71 48% 
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Total number of civil servants surveyed 148 100% 
 
The 47 completed surveys (32% response rate) concern respondents involved in 24 
different audits (out of the 49 retrieved). This corresponds to 49% of all performance 
audit reports published between 2005 and 2010. The 47 respondents came from 18 
different organizations, which represent 41% of the 44 organizations involved in the 
performance audits published between 2005 and 2010. 
 
Response rates by type of organizations are distributed as follows:   
 
 Number of 
respondents 
Completed questionnaires 
(n=47) 
Ministry 33 70.2% 
Agency 3 6.4% 
Governmental organization 5 10.6% 
Other 6 12.8% 
Totals: 47 100% 
  
Professional categories of respondents are:   
 Completed questionnaires (n=47) 
Top management 27.7% 
Middle management 31.9% 
Professional 4.3% 
Civil servant level A 31.9% 
Civil servant level B 4.3% 
Total: 100% 
  
A 7-point measurement scale was used in this survey. The mean of a sub-variable was 
calculated by dividing the sum of the values reported by the respondents by the total 
number of respondents that answered the question assigned to this sub-variable. Let 𝑋 be 
a sub-variable whose mean ?̅? was calculated for a type of organization (Ministry, 
Agency, Governmental organization, Other) made up of N respondents. The mean is 
formulated as: ?̅? =
∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
 , where 𝑥𝑖 is the value reported by respondent i, included 
 14 
between 1 and 7 on a Likert  scale;  𝑛 ≤ 𝑁 is the number of respondents who answered 
the question referenced by the sub-variable.
 2
 
 
The means for all types of organization combined were also calculated as explained 
above. This calculation corresponds to the sum of the values reported by the respondents, 
for all types of organization combined, which was divided by the total number of 
respondents that attributed a value to the sub-variable in question.  
 
Global scores were calculated for the following aggregate variables: 
 Contribution of performance audit  
 Preventive effect  
 Influence on management practices  
 Usefulness of auditor’s report  
 Concrete actions taken following the performance audit  
 Consequences for the organization. 
 
These global scores were calculated by computing, for each respondent, the mean of the 
values of the sub-variables that make up the aggregate variable (for which the global 
score was calculated). For example, for a given respondent, the sum of the values of the 
sub-variables constituting the aggregate variable “Preventive effect” for that respondent 
was divided by the total number of sub-variables for which the respondent reported a 
value (scale of 1 to 7). A mean for each aggregate variable for all types of organizations 
was also calculated.  
From the auditees’ standpoint, what influence did the Court exert on 
organizational life following the performance audit? 
 
Auditees surveyed unanimously acknowledged that the Court’s reports had a fairly 
marginal impact on management of organizations audited. The reports promoted some 
improvement of management (mean of 2.9/7) and did not cause deterioration of 
                                                          
2
 Thanks to Mr. Dieunedort Tiomo Demanou, a master in quantitative methods student at HEC Montreal 
(Canada), who transferred the data from SPSS to the data analysis software SAS (Statistical Analysis 
System), and performed statistical analyses under one of the researchers’ supervision. 
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management (mean of 1.2/7) (see table 1)
3
. In answer to the question “How would you 
evaluate the impact VFM audit has had on the state of management in your 
organization?” the auditees surveyed attributed an overall average of 3.2/7, which 
suggests that auditors had exerted influence on the organizational life of the entities 
audited, although it was meager.   
 
Global scores calculated (see table 2a) indicate that when the auditees surveyed were 
asked for their perception of the usefulness of the auditors’ report, they were more 
inclined to recognize added value in the auditors’ work in their organization (mean of 4/7 
for all types of organizations combined with means of 4.3 for ministries and 
governmental organizations). The auditors’ visit increased auditees’ confidence in the 
operational and control mechanisms in place in their organization, with a mean of 4.2/7 
for all types of organizations combined (see table 2b). 
 
We will now examine how each impact variable was evaluated by the auditees surveyed.      
 
Contribution of performance audit (table 3) 
 
Auditors of the Court were perceived not only as agents of change by the auditees 
surveyed but also as independent and competent experts that detected or drew attention to 
important problems in the audited organization (conceptual impact) (see table 3). 
Auditees thus recognize that auditors had contributed to:   
 Highlighting inconsistencies in some of the organization’s programs or activities 
(mean of 4.5/7 for all types of organizations combined); shedding new light on the 
situation (3.6/7) and having deficiencies noted serve as an example for the 
organization’s other programs (3.1/7); 
 Confirming the need for change (mean of 4.4/7 for all types of organizations 
combined with means of 4.6 for ministries and governmental organizations, 
                                                          
3
 When differences between the mean of each type of organization for the variables, sub-variables and 
global scores were not statistically significant (p-value > .05), the analysis of the respective means of 
different types of organization is not pertinent and consequently not presented.  
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differences between the means by type of organization is statistically significant: p-
value < .05); and prompting change (4.2/7); 
 Attracting the attention of the deputy minister or the manager concerned  (mean of 
3.9/7 for all types of organizations combined) and parliamentarians and the public 
(3.3/7) to a particular problem; 
 Obtaining evaluation from an authority external to the organization (mean of 3.9/7 for 
all types of organizations combined). 
 
To a lesser extent, auditors were perceived as having supported the managers in place. 
For example, auditees surveyed reported that auditors sometimes supported them in 
carrying out certain projects (3.6/7) and had helped them improve the quality of 
information used in decision-making (3.5/7). The respondents also mentioned that 
auditors sometimes endorsed changes made by managers (3.7/7), corroborated a program 
evaluation (3.3/7) or allowed the evaluation of programs that the political authorities in 
office did not want evaluated (3.1/7). Thus, it seems that auditors were occasionally 
perceived as validating and thereby reinforcing the credibility of auditees’ decisions. 
 
Auditors recommendations, namely those related to the implementation of more reliable 
controls (mean of 3.7/7 for all types of organizations combined, with means of over 4/7 
for ministries and governmental organizations) and those related to improvement of 
existing controls, keeping only those necessary to ensure operational efficiency (3.1/7), 
were echoed by the auditees surveyed. It seems that auditors are fairly credible to the 
auditees when they examined controls put in place.   
 
Preventive effect exerted on auditees 
 
Even if the prevention effect exerted on auditees probably does not measure up to the 
auditors’ expectations, auditors nonetheless made auditees apprehensive, which led them 
to take measures to prepare for a possible visit by auditors. When asked “In your opinion, 
how much of a preventive effect is there in knowing that auditors may one day carry out 
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a performance audit in your organization?” auditees rated the measures below, which 
were stated in the questionnaire (see table 4):  
 Implementation of preventive and detection controls (mean of 4.1/7, for all types of 
organizations combined) 
 Compliance with the laws and regulations governing the organization (3.9/7) 
 Implementation of more efficient management practices (3.8/7) 
 Production of more reliable information regarding the organization’s performance 
(3.7/7) 
 Reduction of fraud and dishonesty (3.5/7) 
 Waste elimination (3.2/7). 
 
Therefore, regarding the putting in place of adequate controls in organizations, auditors 
wielded power to influence auditees even when they did not visit that particular 
organization.   
 
Influence on management practices 
 
This power that the auditors seem to possess, namely to incite auditees to put appropriate 
controls in place, was translated very little by the documentation of decisions (mean of 
3.6/7) and by operational and financial controls (3.5/7 with a mean of 4/7 for ministries 
and governmental organizations). Clearly, auditors are powerless to notably influence 
auditees’ management practices (instrumental impact), in several respects (see table 5).  
 
Usefulness of auditors’ reports 
 
With several means higher than 4/7, this variable seems to have created the widest 
consensus among the survey respondents. For several sub-variables, these means range 
from 4 to 4.8/7 for ministries and up to 5.5/7 for governmental organizations (see table 
6). Note that these mainly refer to forms of conceptual impact, and to a much lesser 
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extent to strategic or instrumental impact. Auditors’ reports have thus been useful to 
auditees, in several ways:   
 Stimulate reflection (mean of 4.7/7 for all types of organizations combined; means of 
4.8 for ministries and 5.5 for governmental organizations) 
 Enrich organizational memory (4.4) 
 A valid basis for discussion (mean of 4.4/7 for all types of organizations combined; 
means of 4.7 for ministries and 4.8 for governmental organizations) 
 Move from discussion to action (4.3) 
 Validate positions taken or observations made (mean of 4.3/7 for all types of 
organizations combined; means of 4.7 for ministries and 5 for governmental 
organizations) 
 Learn from mistakes (mean of 4.3/7 for all types of organizations combined; means of 
4.6 for ministries and 5 for governmental organizations) 
 Provide data useful in implementing certain projects (mean of 4.2/7 for all types of 
organizations combined; means of 4.6 for ministries and 5 for governmental 
organizations) 
 Clear up a situation (4) 
 Serve as a strong point in arguments between different parties (mean of 4/7 for all 
types of organizations combined; means of 4.2 for ministries and 4.8 for 
governmental organizations). 
 
Concrete actions taken following performance audits 
 
Performance audits did not truly drive initiatives such as rationalization of operations 
(mean of 3.3/7 for all types of organizations combined; means higher than 3.7 in 
ministries), or reorganization of the organization or information systems, program reform 
or amendment of existing laws or regulations (means of 3 or lower) (see table 7) (i.e. 
forms of instrumental impact). Note that these operations are generally ordered by the 
political powers. Auditors’ influence is understandably marginal in this context. 
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Consequences for the organization 
 
The negative consequences that the literature (Carson & Carson, 1993; Deming, 1986; 
Leeuw, 1996a), 1996b), 1997; Parker, 1986; Smith, 1993, 1995) anticipates when 
managers’ performance is evaluated were not manifested in this study whether we 
questioned the respondents about the negative consequences on their organization or on 
themselves. 
 
Auditees surveyed almost unanimously confirmed that performance audits did not have 
negative consequences in their organization (see Table 8). The following conditions were 
tested: 
 Increase in the organization’s short-term operating costs with no mid-term benefits to 
compensate for the increase (1.5/7) 
 Multiplication of controls extensive enough to hinder achievement of objectives (1.5)  
 Dissatisfaction of target clienteles owing to a considerable loss of efficiency in the 
delivery of services following implementation of additional controls recommended by 
the auditors (1.4) 
 Organizational paralysis (1.3). 
 
Impact on you personally 
 
None of the sub-variables exceeded 3/7 regarding the potential effects of a performance 
audit on the auditees personally (see table 9).  The good news is that none of the negative 
consequences stated in the literature was manifested, specifically a loss of motivation, 
tendency to restrain auditee’s initiatives, negative influence on future work and on career 
or a decline in performance. 
 
Relevance of the recommendations 
 
The auditees attributed an average of 4.9/7 for all types of organizations combined to 
affirm that auditors’ recommendations were appropriate, realistic and applicable (see 
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table 10). This is good news for auditors, especially because flaws in recommendations 
formulated are exceptional. Auditees surveyed nonetheless claimed that auditors’ 
recommendations were sometimes theoretically valid but difficult to apply (mean of 3.9/7 
for all types of organizations combined). For the other shortcomings tested, the mean was 
at most 2.9/7 (see table 10 for results obtained for the other sub-variables). 
 
Relations with interest groups 
 
Auditees were asked whether performance audits had improved or worsened relations 
with interest groups below (see table 11): 
 Citizens who are clients of the organization; 
 Partners of the organization (other organizations, firms, etc.); 
 Central agencies (Ministry, Treasury Board, Executive Council, etc.); 
 Political agencies (Minister, Parliamentarians); 
 General public. 
 
Here, the impact of the audit is very marginal: means were at most 2.9/7 (for all types of 
organizations combined) for improvement of relations, and worsening of relations was at 
most 1.8/7 (which signals practically no impact noted by the auditees surveyed). 
 
Influence of environmental conditions on the impact of the performance 
audit 
 
Auditors’ successes and failures when they try to influence the management of 
organizations audited are not dictated solely by the auditors’ own actions. This is why 
respondents were asked to appreciate conditions that might have favored or weakened 
auditors’ influence. 
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Environmental conditions  
 
Auditees rated several environmental conditions inspired by previous works (Pollitt et al., 
1999; Morin, 2001; Van Loocke and Put, 2010, 2011) (see Table 12). Only the place of 
auditors’ recommendations within priorities guiding management in the organization 
audited (mean of 3.3/7 for all types of organizations combined) and the will of those at 
the base of the organization audited (3.2/7) seems to have somewhat influenced auditors’ 
impact on the audited organization. The will of central authorities (2.6/7) and political 
will (2.5/7) played a smaller role. These conditions thus reinforced the impact auditors 
envisioned. In addition, none of the conditions tested dampened auditors’ impact (means 
of 1.8 and under for all sub-variables). 
 
Parliamentarians’ involvement 
 
Of the 47 respondents who completed the survey, only 13 stated that the performance 
audit led to a hearing before a parliamentary committee (see Table 14). The responses of 
these 13 auditees show that the impact of Parliamentarians on the course of actions after 
the performance audit was marginal. The good news for auditors is that when manifested, 
the influence of Parliamentarians has a positive effect on the follow-up by auditees (see 
table 15):  
 Acceleration of implementation of concrete measures to correct the problems spotted 
by auditors (mean of 3.1/7 for all types of organizations combined) 
 Acceleration of move from discussion to action concerning the problems spotted by 
auditors (3.2) 
 Creation of a sense of urgency among auditees to make corrections for the problems 
spotted by auditors (3.1). 
 
Even if the impact of Parliamentarians is not pronounced (perhaps because a limited 
number of audit reports were discussed before a committee), the results are nonetheless 
coherent with the impacts anticipated in the literature, namely that Parliamentarians’ 
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actions contribute to accelerating auditees’ application of recommendations (Malloy 
2004; Morin, 2008; Pollitt et al. 1999).  
 
Press involvement 
 
Only eight respondents (out of 47) affirmed that auditors’ reports received press coverage 
(see table 16). Here again, the effect of this coverage reinforces auditors’ actions. This 
influence was felt because it reactivated the debate among political authorities (mean of 
3.1/7 for all types of organizations combined) and it forced the correction of serious 
deficiencies in the organizations’ operations (3.3/7) (see table 17). The auditees surveyed 
did not perceive negative consequences related to this press coverage.   
 
Relations with the auditors 
 
The fluidity of communications between auditors and auditees (mean of 4.2/7 for all 
types of organizations combined) and openness shown by auditors (4.1/7) contributed the 
most to reinforcing the impact sought by auditors (see table 13a). The auditees surveyed 
recognize that auditors’ actions in audited organizations were credible and legitimate 
(3.9/7). The most frequently seen source of dissatisfaction regarding the presence of 
auditors at their organization was the increased workload of auditees (mean of 3.5/7) (see 
table 13b). 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
 
Having an impact on the Administrations audited is part of the rationale of most of the 
Supreme Audit Institutions, as we stipulated in the introduction of this article. Systematic 
evidence on this impact still remains scarcely available. With this study, we have tried to 
go beyond the “wishful thinking” about the impact of the performance audits of the Court 
of Audit on Belgian federal Administration. We have also studied the factors that might 
have influenced this impact. We replicated a survey that has earlier been conducted in a 
Canadian (Morin, 2008, 2014), i.e. Westminster-style context. As such, the results 
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present an independent test and external validity check of the Canadian findings in a 
Napoleonic court tradition. However, we did not envisage a full-fledged comparative 
study. In addition, the survey provided the opportunity to test, for the first time, a 
comprehensive model, developed by Van Loocke and Put (2010, 2011) on factors that 
influence SAIs’ impact on Administrations. Consequently, our findings might be relevant 
for academic and for practitioner purposes as well. 
Do SAIs’ performance audits have an impact on the Administrations audited? Our study 
revealed that performance audits that were conducted by the Belgian Court of Audit 
between 2005 and 2010, did have an – although limited – impact on the audited entities. 
This finding confirms what Morin (2008, 2014) stated in a Canadian context: there were 
no radical changes or ‘palace revolutions’ in the organizations under study, but the 
impact of the intervention of the auditors was noticeable. This impact was not invasive, 
but ‘slow and subtle’ (Morin, 2008, p. 717). The nature of the impact was rather 
conceptual than strategic or instrumental. This supports what is known from the literature 
on policy evaluation, namely that conceptual impact usually precedes the other two forms 
(Cummings, 2002; Van Loocke & Put, 2010). The expectation that audits could have a 
negative psychological impact, like Lonsdale (1999) suggested, could not be confirmed 
in the Canadian context (Morin, 2008, 2014), just as little as in this Belgian study.  
Which factors contribute to the impact of SAIs’ performance audits? Morin’s 
questionnaire allowed examining the relevance of variables identified by Van Loocke and 
Put (2010) which they judged as plausible causal factors in reinforcing the impact of 
performance audits. According to the respondents surveyed, all factors, or at least those 
that could be measured in our research, turned out to have a small to perceptible effect on 
impact. Of the factors at micro-level (i.e. related to the audit), the relations with the 
auditor (like fluidity of communications, openness shown by the auditors, recognition of 
the credibility and legitimacy of the auditors by the auditees) and the qualities attributed 
to the recommendations (appropriate, realistic and applicable) seemed important. This 
confirms the importance of collaborative processes with more regard and empathy for the 
audited organization’s context, as was recently concluded by Van Acker et al (2014) on 
the basis of case studies in six European countries. The importance of the factors at meso-
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level (concerning the Court and the auditees) was recognized mainly through the will of 
those at the base of the organization, but other factors seemed relevant but to a lesser 
extent, notably the place of auditor’s recommendations within the priorities guiding 
management, the will of central authorities and political will. Morin (2014) suggested 
that a consensus between the three centers of power with regard to the recommendations 
of the auditors – those at the base of the organization, management and politics – is 
important to their implementation. However, the little number of reports discussed by 
Parliamentarians and spotted by the press (mentioned by the respondents) prevents us to 
conclude about the actual influence of this factor in the Belgian federal context. 
In this first time study on Belgium Court of Audit’s impact on Administration through its 
performance audits over a five-year period, the auditees surveyed did not question the 
legitimacy of the Court. Their perception of the auditors’ work is rather positive and they 
pay attention to Court’s recommendations considered as appropriate and relevant. One of 
the options that is considered in this respect, is whether the questionnaire of this study 
can be replicated on a regular base. This is a merit of this research in itself. And perhaps 
this can pave the way for future systematic impact studies in other countries as well. 
This being said, more and better impact studies remain necessary. Only on the basis of 
Morin’s questionnaire, an extensive research agenda could be developed. Next to 
internationally comparative research, which can help to get insight in the reinforcing 
factors at macro-level (e.g. a more in-depth study on the differences between the 
Westminster and Napoleonic tradition), it would, for instance, be interesting to compare 
the different levels of government in Belgium, to collect more information on factors at 
meso-level. Because some relevant institutional aspects differ strongly (e.g. in Flanders 
almost all performance audit reports are debated in the Flemish Parliament and get 
extensive media coverage), involving the other state levels in the study could have led to 
other findings. The differences between government organizations, and between civil 
servants of different levels, could also be further investigated.  
We realize that much bigger and high quality samples are needed, to have a full 
understanding of the complexity of the relationships between all possible influencing 
factors. Such samples would also enable to operationalize impact in a more fine-grained 
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way, on the basis of factor scores for the different elements. However, these ambitions 
could be better achieved with the cooperation of the SAIs: when the auditees can be 
identified via the auditors, the sample could be more targeted, with a higher chance of 
relevance of the responses to the survey. This strategy would as well allow linking the 
auditees to specific audits, rather than assessing all performance audits of an organization 
as a whole.  
Further research should also include more objective data on the impact of the audits to 
complement the methodology we used in this study, which only tests the subjective 
perception of the impact of one party involved. It must be recognized that performance 
auditing takes place within an accountability relationship with three parties: a Supreme 
Audit Institution audits the Administration and Government and reports on these to the 
Parliament. In addition, the media and interest groups play an important role as mediator 
of the audit findings. A combination of the present survey, with the percentage of 
implemented recommendations (i.e. the ‘traditional’ impact indicator, with its known 
backdrops), third party interviews, and case studies, would give a more valid image of the 
real impact of the audits under study. Moreover, a more complex conception of causality, 
which gives account to set theoretic notions of necessary and sufficiency, and non-linear 
causality, would enrich possible findings. Such alternative conceptions would require 
different methods: configurational comparative methods such as Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis would be a logical avenue. 
An unclaimed, but related, topic remains the use of audits by the Parliamentarians. To 
what extent, and in which way do Parliamentarians use the audits that are conducted?  
This was studied in a Canadian context when Sheila Fraser was Auditor General from 
2001-2011 (Morin, 2015). However, the Parliamentarians’ use of SAIs reports remains 
also a field scarcely visited in western Administrations. This absence of empirical data 
about the influence of SAIs on Parliamentarians’ debates contributes to the perpetuation 
of the “magical thinking” when it comes to assess the actual influence of SAIs through 
the performance audits they have been conducting in the Administrations for nearly 40 
years.  
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Table 1 – Overall impact on organization audited 
Variable Ministry Agency 
Governmental 
Organization 
Other All 
p- 
value* 
Improvement of 
management 3 1 3.4 2.7 2.9 0.1574 
Deterioration of 
management 1.3 1 1.2 1 1.2 .6628 
Overall effect of 
performance audit 3.4 1.7 3.2 3.3 3.2 0.1112 
Notes: 
 *Significant at the 0.05 level 
Seven-category Likert-type scale  
 
 
 
Table 2a  – Global scores 
 
Variable Ministry Agency 
Governmental 
Organization 
Other All 
p-
value* 
Contribution of 
performance audit  3,8 1,7 4,0 2,9 3,6 0.0178* 
Preventive effect 
3,8 2,4 3,9 3,3 3,6 0,4220 
Influence on 
management 
practices  3,4 1,7 3,0 2,3 3,1 0,1426 
Usefulness of 
auditors reports  4,3 1,7 4,3 3,2 4 0.0133* 
Concrete actions 
taken following the 
performance audit  2,8 1,2 2,4 2,4 2,6 0,2161 
Consequences for the 
organization  1,5 1,0 1,5 1,1 1,4 0,3623 
Notes: 
 *Significant at the 0.05 level 
Seven-category Likert-type scale  
 
 
Table 2b – Reliability Seal 
 
Has the audit influenced your 
confidence in the reliability of 
your organization’s operating 
and control mechanisms? Ministry Agency 
Governmental 
organization Other All 
 
p-
value* 
It has made me more confident 4.1 1.7 5 5.2 4.2 0.0151* 
It has made me less confident 2.4 1 2.5 1.4 2.2 0.1823 
Notes: 
 *Significant at the 0.05 level 
Seven-category Likert-type scale   
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Table 3 – Contribution of performance audits 
 
 
 
Notes: 
 * Significant at the 0.05 level 
    Seven-category Likert-type scale 
 
 
  
Sub-variables Ministry Agency 
Governmental 
Organization 
Other All 
p-
value* 
Highlighting inconsistencies in some of the 
organization’s programs or activities 
4.6 3.3 5.2 4 4.5 0.3578 
Confirming the need for change 4.6 1.3 4.6 4.8 4.4 0.0446* 
Prompting change 4.6 1.7 4.2 3.8 4.2 0.0581 
Obtaining evaluation from an authority 
external to the organization 4 2.7 3.8 4 3.9 0.822 
Attracting the attention of the deputy 
minister or the manager concerned to a 
particular problem 
3.9 1.3 4.8 4.4 3.9 0.1180 
Endorsing changes made 3.8 1.3 4.8 3.2 3.7 0.0509 
Establishing more reliable controls 4.1 1.7 4.8 2.5 3.7 0.0102* 
Establishing controls guaranteeing the 
fairness of decisions made by the 
organization? 
4 1.7 4.3 2.4 3.7 0.0483* 
Shedding new light on the situation 
3.9 2 3.2 3.2 3.6 0.1699 
Supporting management in carrying out 
certain projects 4 1.3 2.6 3.2 3.6 0.0668 
Improving the quality of information used 
in decision-making 3.9 1.7 3.8 2.3 3.5 0.0430* 
Corroborating a program evaluation 3.6 1.7 3.3 2.4 3.3 0.3514 
Attracting the attention of parliamentarians 
and  the public to a particular problem 3.6 1.3 4.5 2.2 3.3 0.1400 
Allowing the evaluation of programs that 
the political authorities in office did not 
want evaluated 
3.4 1.3 3 2.4 3.1 0.3742 
Serving as an example for the 
organization’s other programs? 
3.2 1.3 5 1.8 3.1 0.0025* 
Streamlining existing controls, keeping 
only those necessary to ensure operational 
efficiency 
3.4 1.7 4 1.4 3.1 0.0406* 
Reducing operating costs 2.1 1.3 2.6 1.7 2 0.6229 
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Table 4 - Preventive effect 
Notes: 
 * Significant at the 0.05 level 
    Seven-category Likert-type scale  
Sub-variables Ministry Agency 
Governmental 
Organization 
Other All 
p-
value* 
Implementation of preventive and 
detection controls 
4.2 3.3 5 3.6 4.1 0.5623 
Compliance with the laws and regulations 
governing your organization 
3.9 3 4.8 3.6 3.9 0.5025 
Implementation of more efficient 
management practices 
3.9 1.7 4.3 3.8 3.8 0.2124 
Production of more reliable information 
regarding the organization’s performance 
3.8 2.7 4 3.6 3.7 0.7739 
Reducing fraud and dishonesty 3.6 3 3.6 3.2 3.5 0.9407 
Waste elimination 3.6 1.7 2.6 2.6 3.2 0.1833 
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Table 5 – Influence on management practices 
Notes: 
 * Significant at the 0.05 level 
    Seven-category Likert-type scale 
  
Sub-variables Ministry Agency 
Governmental 
Organization 
Other All 
p-
value* 
Management practices related to 
documentation of decisions made 
4 1.7 3.8 2.6 3.6 0.0868 
Management practices related to financial 
and operational control 
4 1.7 4 1.8 3.5 0.0316* 
Management practices related to work 
organization 
3.6 1.7 3.6 2.8 3.4 0.2528 
Management practices related to the 
definition of priorities 
3.3 1.7 4 4 3.3 0.2749 
Use of strategic planning as a management 
tool 
3.2 1.7 2.8 2.8 3 0.5800 
Management practices related to 
management information used in decision-
making 
3.3 1.7 2.8 2.4 3 0.4238 
Management practices related to 
performance measurement 
3.5 1.7 2.5 1.2 3 0.0274* 
Management practices related to 
performance checks with regard to 
previous performance commitments 
3.4 1.7 3 1.4 3 0.0939 
Use of annual operational plans as a 
management tool 
3.1 1.7 2.8 2.6 2.9 0.5848 
Management practices related to better 
program outcomes 
3.4 1.7 2.5 1.8 2.9 0.1776 
Intensified efforts in personnel training 3 1.7 2.6 2.6 2.8 0.6218 
Intensified efforts to communicate to 
personnel information about orientations 
and mission 
3 1.7 2.6 2.6 2.8 0.5789 
Management practices related to increased 
productivity 
3.1 1.7 2.5 1.2 2.7 0.1295 
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Table 6 – Usefulness of auditors’ reports 
 
Notes: 
 * Significant at the 0.05 level 
    Seven-category Likert-type scale 
 
 
  
Sub-variables Ministry Agency 
Governmental 
Organization 
Other All 
p-
value* 
Stimulate reflection 4.8 2 5.5 4.8 4.7 0.0400* 
Enrich organizational memory 4.6 2 5.3 3.6 4.4 0.0778 
A valid basis for discussion 4.7 1.3 4.8 4.2 4.4 0.0424* 
Move from discussion to action 4.6 2.7 4 3.6 4.3 0.3393 
Validate positions taken or observations 
made 
4.7 2 5 3 4.3 0.0165* 
Learn from mistakes 4.6 2 5 3.2 4.3 0.0350* 
Provide data useful in implementing 
certain projects 
4.6 1.7 5 2.8 4.2 0.0224* 
Clear up a situation 4.3 2 3.5 3.2 4 0.1873 
Strong point in arguments between 
different parties 
4.2 1 4.8 4.4 4 0.0391* 
Evaluate management practices more 
objectively 
4.3 1.7 4.3 2 3.8 0.0095* 
Reinforce sound management principles 4.1 2 4.7 2 3.8 0.0292* 
An opportunity to challenge teams and 
programs 
4.2 1.3 4 3.2 3.8 0.0779 
Realign programs. Services 4.3 1.3 3.8 2 3.7 0.0254* 
An opportunity to pressure central 
authorities or other parties 
4.1 1 2.8 4 3.7 0.1006 
Realign policies 3.9 2 2.8 2.2 3.5 0.1160 
A weapon for the opposition or interest 
groups 
3.8 2 4 2.8 3.5 0.4154 
Facilitate the signing of agreements  or 
protocols 
3.3 1 2.7 2.8 3 0.3734 
 32 
Table 7 – Concrete actions taken following performance audits 
 
 
Notes: 
 * Significant at the 0.05 level 
    Seven-category Likert-type scale 
  
Sub-variables Ministry Agency 
Governmental 
Organization 
Other All 
p-
value* 
Rationalization of operations 3.7 1.7 3 1.8 3.3 0.0447* 
Reorganization of the organization 3.1 1.7 3 2.6 3 0.6404 
Program reform 3.4 1.7 2.8 2.2 3 0.2787 
Reorganization of information systems 3.3 1 2.8 2.2 2.9 0.2421 
Amendment of existing laws or regulations 3.2 1 2.4 3.2 2.9 0.2961 
Adoption of new laws or regulations 3 1 2 3.2 2.7 0.3008 
Creation of new work groups or reform of 
existing groups 
2.8 1 2 3.2 2.6 0.3975 
Recruitment of additional staff 1.9 1 1.6 2.2 1.8 0.7264 
Layoff of existing staff 1.2 1 1.6 1 1.2 0.5669 
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Table 8 – Consequences for the organization 
 
Notes: 
 * Significant at the 0.05 level 
    Seven-category Likert-type scale 
 
 
 
 
  
Sub-variables Ministry Agency 
Governmental 
Organization 
Other All 
p-
value* 
Increase in the organization’s short-term 
operating costs with no mid-term benefits 
to compensate for the increase 
1.5 1 1.8 1.3 1.5 0.5656 
Multiplication of controls extensive 
enough to hinder achievement of 
objectives 
1.7 1 1.4 1 1.5 0.3899 
Dissatisfaction of target clienteles owing to 
a considerable loss of efficiency in the 
delivery of services following 
implementation of additional controls 
recommended by the auditors 
1.5 1 1.4 1 1.4 0.4158 
Organizational paralysis 1.4 1 1.4 1 1.3 0.5077 
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Table 9 – Impact on you personally 
 
 
Notes: 
 * Significant at the 0.05 level 
    Seven-category Likert-type scale 
 
  
Sub-variables Ministry Agency 
Governmental 
Organization 
Other All 
p-
value* 
Tendency to encourage you to take certain 
initiatives 
3 1.3 2.6 3 2.9 0.4394 
Increase in motivation 3.1 1.7 2.6 2.2 2.8 0.4097 
Improvement in your performance 2.7 1.3 2.2 1.8 2.4 0.3405 
Tendency to promote mid- to long-term 
objectives 
2.5 1.7 2.2 2 2.4 0.7321 
Your superiors have become less confident 2 1 2 1.5 1.9 0.5698 
Positive influence on your future work or 
on your career 
2.1 1 2.4 1.2 1.9 0.2691 
Your superiors have become more 
confident 
1.8 1.3 1.8 1.3 1.7 0.8007 
Your subordinates have become less 
confident 
1.8 1.7 1.4 2 1.7 0.8844 
Your subordinates have become more 
confident 
1.8 1 2 1 1.6 0.2124 
Tendency to focus on the attainment of 
short-term objectives at the expense of 
long-term ones 
1.8 1 1.4 1 1.5 0.3503 
Loss of motivation 1.4 1 1.4 1 1.3 0.5944 
Tendency to restrain your initiatives 1.4 1 1.6 1 1.3 0.4653 
Negative influence on your future work or 
on your career 
1.4 1 1.6 1 1.3 0.6937 
Decline in your performance 1.1 1 1.4 1 1.1 0.4641 
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Table 10 – Relevance of recommendations 
Notes: 
* Significant at the 0.05 level 
    Seven-category Likert-type scale 
 
  
Sub-variables Ministry Agency 
Governmental 
Organization 
Other All 
p-
value* 
Recommendations are appropriate, 
realistic and applicable 
5.1 3.3 4.8 5.2 4.9 0.2226 
Recommendations theoretically valid  but 
difficult to apply 
3.9 4 4.5 3.2 3.9 0.6924 
Recommendations do not truly reach the 
source of the problem 
3.1 2 2.8 2.2 2.9 0.6031 
Recommendations are outdated because of 
important changes in the internal or 
external environment of the organization 
audited (new management model. 
administrative decisions or policies. etc.) 
2.8 3 3.8 2.8 2.9 0.8089 
Recommendations are incompatible with 
trends toward management by results. 
2.9 2 4.7 2.3 2.9 0.3359 
Recommendations are incompatible with 
trends toward decentralization of decision-
making power 
2.8 2 3.3 3 2.8 0.8553 
Recommendations are incompatible with 
trends advocating innovation in public 
affairs management 
2.9 2 4.3 2 2.8 0.4354 
Recommendations do not address serious 
problems. 
2.7 3.3 3.8 1.6 2.7 0.2663 
Recommendations are incompatible with 
trends toward greater empowerment of 
public managers. 
2.8 2.7 2.5 2 2.7 0.8763 
Recommendations are too detailed and 
narrow, not leaving enough maneuvering 
room 
2.7 2.7 3.3 1.2 2.6 0.2188 
Recommendations are too vague 2.5 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.4 0.9709 
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Table 11 – Relations with interests’ groups 
 
Notes: 
 * Significant at the 0.05 level 
    Seven-category Likert-type scale 
  
Sub-variables Ministry Agency 
Governmental 
Organization 
Other All 
p-
value* 
Citizens who are clients of your 
organization: improvement in relations 
2.7 1 2.4 1 2.3 0.1143 
Citizens who are clients of your 
organization: deterioration in relations 
1.9 1 2 1 1.7 0.4733 
Partners of your organization (other 
organizations, firms, etc.): improvement 
in relations 
3 1.7 2.4 2.4 2.8 0.5615 
Partners of your organization (other 
organizations, firms, etc.): deterioration 
in relations 
1.7 1.7 2 1.4 1.7 0.9035 
Central agencies (Ministry, Treasury 
Board, Executive Council, etc.): 
improvement in relations 
3 1 2.4 2.4 2.7 0.2206 
Central agencies (Ministry, Treasury 
Board, Executive Council, etc.): 
deterioration in relations 
1.7 1 1.6 1.4 1.6 0.7596 
Political agencies (Minister, 
parliamentarians): improvement in 
relations 
2.4 1.3 2.8 2.2 2.4 0.4092 
Political agencies (Minister, 
parliamentarians): deterioration in 
relations 
1.8 1.3 1.6 1 1.6 0.4344 
General public: confirmation of your 
organization’s credibility 
3.2 1.3 3 2 2.9 0.2300 
General public: deterioration of your 
organization’s credibility 
2 2 1.4 1 1.8 0.5092 
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Table 12 – Environmental conditions 
 
Notes: 
 * Significant at the 0.05 level 
    Seven-category Likert-type scale 
 
 
 
  
Sub-variables Ministry Agency 
Governmental 
Organization 
Other All 
p-
value* 
Place of auditors’ recommendations within 
priorities guiding management in the 
organization audited: strengthened impact 
3.8 2 2.5 2.4 3.3 0.1425 
Place of auditors’ recommendations within 
priorities guiding management in the 
organization audited: weakened impact 
1.8 1.3 1.5 1 1.6 0.3199 
Will of those at the base of the 
organization audited: strengthened impact 
3.7 1.7 2.3 2.2 3.2 0.0353* 
Will of those at the base of the 
organization audited: weakened impact 
1.7 1.3 1.5 1 1.6 0.3434 
Political will: strengthened impact 2.6 1 2.8 2.6 2.5 0.5563 
Political will: weakened impact 1.8 1 1.5 1 1.6 0.5707 
Will of central authorities: strengthened 
impact 
2.8 1 3 2.6 2.6 0.2907 
Will of central authorities: weakened 
impact 
1.9 1 1.7 1 1.6 0.2430 
Timing of VFM audit: strengthened 
impact 
2.1 2 2.3 1 2 0.3209 
Timing of VFM audit: weakened impact 1.9 2 1.7 1 1.8 0.4572 
Major reorganization in the organization 
audited: strengthened impact 
2.2 2 2.2 1.4 2.1 0.7795 
Major reorganization in the organization 
audited: weakened impact 
1.6 2 1.4 1 1.5 0.4092 
Departure of key people: strengthened 
impact 
1.6 1.3 1.4 1 1.5 0.4960 
Departure of key people: weakened 
impact 
1.8 1.3 1.4 1 1.6 0.3781 
Reform at government level: strengthened 
impact 
2.4 1 1.6 1.6 2.1 0.1980 
Reform at government level: weakened 
impact 
1.7 1 1.4 1 1.5 0.4300 
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Table 13a – Relations with the auditors 
Notes: 
 * Significant at the 0.05 level 
    Seven-category Likert-type scale 
 
  
Sub-variables Ministry Agency 
Governmental 
Organization 
Other All 
p-
value* 
Recognition of the credibility of the 
auditors: strengthened impact 
4 3.3 4 3.6 3.9 0.9015 
Absence. in your view. of the credibility of 
the auditors: weakened impact 
1.6 1 1.6 1 1.5 0.6542 
Recognition of the legitimacy of the 
intervention of the auditors: strengthened 
impact 
3.9 3.3 4.4 3.6 3.9 0.8534 
Negation of the legitimacy of the 
intervention of the auditors: weakened 
impact 
1.4 1 2.2 1 1.4 0.2214 
Collegial leadership style shown by the 
auditors: strengthened impact 
3.1 4.7 4 3.3 3.4 0.4482 
Authoritarian leadership style shown by 
the auditors: weakened impact 
1.7 1 2.3 1.8 1.7 0.6143 
Fluidity of communications between 
auditors and auditees: strengthened 
impact 
4 4.7 4.8 4 4.2 0.8239 
Problems with communications between 
auditors and auditees: weakened impact 
1.9 1 3 2 2 0.4229 
Openness shown by auditors: 
strengthened impact 
4.2 2 5 3.6 4.1 0.1605 
Lack of openness shown by auditors: 
weakened impact 
1.9 2.3 3.2 1.4 2.1 0.3270 
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Table 13b – Sources of dissatisfaction with auditors 
 
 
Notes: 
 * Significant at the 0.05 level 
    Seven-category Likert-type scale 
 
 
Sub-variables Ministry Agency 
Governmental 
Organization 
Other All 
p-
value* 
Auditors' presence adding to your regular 
workload 
3.4 4 4.2 2.8 3.5 0.4304 
Auditors' tendency to spend more time on 
details than on essentials 
3.1 1.3 2.2 2.3 2.8 0.1818 
Auditors’ lack of subtlety and sensitivity to 
context.  intransigence 
2.4 1 3 2.8 2.4 0.2977 
Report mentioning negative aspects only. 
positive aspects mentioned rarely or not at 
all 
2.2 3.3 3.5 1.5 2.4 0.2228 
Auditors’  recommendations not realistic 2.1 1.7 3.2 2.5 2.3 0.1821 
Auditors' tendency to favor a 
confrontational rather than a collaborative 
attitude towards auditees 
2.2 1 2.2 2 2.1 0.5173 
Auditing team’s expertise and 
understanding of domain audited deemed 
inadequate 
1.9 2.3 1.8 2 1.9 0.9611 
Auditors’ conceptual vision weak 1.7 1.3 1.8 2.3 1.8 0.8526 
Auditors’ evaluations not objective 1.6 1 2.5 2.2 1.7 0.2462 
Auditors sought sensationalism 1.2 1 2.4 1 1.3 0.1147 
Auditors' actions and words inconsistent 1.2 1 1.8 1 1.2 0.3016 
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Table 14 – Parliamentarians’ involvement 
 
Hearings before a 
parliamentary 
committee? Ministry Agency 
Governmental 
organization Other Total 
No 24 3 4 3 34 
Yes 9 0 1 3 13 
Total 33 3 5 6 47 
 
Table 15 – Impact of Parliamentarians’ involvement 
 
 
Notes: 
 * Significant at the 0.05 level 
    Seven-category Likert-type scale 
 
 
 
  
Sub-variables Ministry Agency 
Governmental 
Organization 
Other All 
p-
value* 
Creation of positive tensions between the 
political and administrative arms. 
accelerating follow-up on 
recommendations 
2.8 - 4 1 2.4 0.0451* 
Creation of negative tensions between the 
political and administrative arms. 
hindering follow-up on recommendations 
2.5 - 4 1 2.3 0.2114 
Acceleration of implementation of 
concrete measures to correct the problems 
spotted by auditors 
3.7 - 4 1 3.1 0.1197 
Hampering of implementation of concrete 
measures to correct the problems spotted 
by auditors 
1.7 - 4 1 1.7 0.0466* 
Acceleration of move from discussion to 
action concerning the problems spotted by 
auditors 
3.7 - 5 1 3.2 0.0802 
Slowing move from discussion to action 
concerning the problems spotted by 
auditors 
1.7 - 3 1 1.6 0.1965 
Creation of a sense of urgency among 
auditees to make corrections for the 
problems spotted by auditors 
3.6 - 5 1 3.1 0.1131 
Creation of paralysis among auditees. 
rendering them incapable of correcting the 
problems spotted by auditors 
1.4 - 3 1 1.5 0.0679 
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Table 16 – Press’ involvement 
Performance 
audit report much 
covered by the 
press? Ministry Agency 
Governmental 
organization Other Total 
No 26 2 5 6 39 
Yes 7 1 0 0 8 
Total 33 3 5 6 47 
 
Table 17 – Impact of press’ involvement 
  
Sub-variables Ministry Agency 
Governmental 
Organization 
Other All 
p-
value* 
Positive effect: it reactivated the debate 
among political authorities 
3.5 1 - - 3.1 0.2457 
Negative effect: it reactivated the debate 
among political authorities 
2 1 - - 1.9 0.3481 
Positive effect:  it forced the correction of 
serious deficiencies in the organization’s 
operations 
3.7 1 - - 3.3 0.3393 
Negative effect: it caused chaos in the 
organization’s operations 
1.7 1 - - 1.6 0.4838 
Positive effect since it provoked the 
departure of incompetent and unproductive 
managers 
2.2 1 - - 2 0.6193 
Negative effect:  it provoked the departure 
of competent and productive managers 
1.3 1 - - 1.3 0.5761 
Positive effect:  the auditees tended to be 
more prudent in their management 
practices in light of the facts reported in 
the media 
3.2 1 - - 2.9 0.3910 
Negative effect:  the auditees tended to be 
overly prudent in their management 
practices in light of the facts reported in 
the media 
1.7 1 - - 1.6 0.4838 
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